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1. Introduction 
As discussed in Lambert et al. (2007), disclosure quality could be negatively related to 
cost of capital due to two separate effects: (i) an information effect in which disclosure reduces 
the assessed covariance of cash flows (holding the expected cash flows constant), or (ii) a 
stewardship effect in which disclosure improves managerial alignment with shareholders and 
therefore increases expected cash flows (holding the assessed covariance of cash flows constant). 
The stewardship effect is not unique to disclosure, but present in other governance mechanisms 
that increase managerial alignment such as inside ownership. As a result, these alternative 
alignment mechanisms potentially reinforce or abate the stewardship effect of disclosure. We test 
this argument by examining whether inside ownership is negatively associated with the cost of 
capital and, if included jointly, how inside ownership affects the relation between disclosure and 
cost of capital. We focus on inside ownership because there is no argument that ownership has 
an information effect, but it reduces misalignment costs (La Porta et al., 2002). Thus, if we 
observe a negative relation between inside ownership and the cost of capital, this suggests that 
misalignment costs affect the cost of capital. 
At the same time, a more pronounced negative effect of disclosure on cost of capital after 
controlling for the stewardship effect of ownership indicates a substitute relation between the 
two monitoring mechanisms. This interpretation builds on a finding from prior literature—that 
disclosure quality is negatively related to inside ownership (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Leuz et 
al., 2003; Haw et al., 2004)—which in turn lets us shed light on the relative magnitude of the 
direct and indirect effects of disclosure. Since disclosure reduces ownership, and (as we predict) 
ownership reduces the cost of capital, we predict and find a positive indirect effect of disclosure 
through ownership. Accordingly, our analysis of the relation between inside ownership and the 
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cost of capital has implications for the documented negative relation between disclosure quality 
and the cost of capital (e.g., Francis et al., 2005; Hail and Leuz, 2006). Our findings suggest that 
the direct effect of disclosure is higher than previously reported. That occurs because, without 
controlling for ownership, the direct effect is offset by a positive relation between disclosure and 
cost of capital via the link of inside ownership. Specifically, because disclosure quality serves as 
a substitute for inside ownership in monitoring, higher disclosure reduces inside ownership, 
which in turn increases misalignment costs. 
To test our hypotheses, we gather a sample of 50,201 firm-year observations from 35 
countries between 1990 and 2004. Our proxy for disclosure quality is the index of disclosure 
requirements in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006). By using country-level 
regulations on disclosure as an arguably exogenous proxy for firm-level disclosure quality, we 
can focus on modeling ownership and predicting its relation with the cost of capital. We measure 
inside ownership as the percentage of shares held by corporate insiders as indicated in 
Worldscope. 
We begin our analyses by confirming the negative direct link between mandatory 
disclosure quality and the cost of capital as shown in Hail and Leuz (2006) using firm-year 
regressions. Next, we examine the role of ownership, and find that it is significantly negatively 
related to the cost of capital (as proxied by the implied cost of capital and realized returns).1 The 
effect is robust to controlling for the potentially endogenous nature of ownership.2 At the same 
time, the introduction of ownership in the cost-of-capital model strengthens the direct effect of 
disclosure, highlighting the importance of controlling for this variable when separating the 
                                                
1 Because inside ownership has both alignment effects through cash flow rights, and entrenchment effects through 
voting rights, we control for entrenchment using proxies for voting rights. 
2 We apply an instrumental variables approach to allow for endogenously determined ownership. The results of the 
first-stage model in the 2SLS regression also confirm prior findings of a negative relation between disclosure quality 
and inside ownership, which serves as basis for the computation of the indirect effect of disclosure on cost of capital. 
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information and stewardship roles of disclosure. Our results suggest that increased ownership 
reduces incentive misalignment and in turn lowers the cost of capital. They also indicate a 
substitute relation between mandatory disclosure quality and inside ownership, consistent with a 
positive indirect effect of disclosure on the cost of capital via the stewardship role of ownership. 
To assess the relative magnitude of the direct and indirect effects of disclosure on the cost 
of capital, we conduct a path analysis. Depending on the specification, the results suggest that the 
direct effect of disclosure using implied costs of capital is on the order of a 40 to 70 basis points 
reduction, going from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the disclosure quality index. The indirect 
effect via inside ownership, on the other hand, is positive and offsets the direct effect by a 
minimum of 6 but up to 30 basis points.3 Thus, the relative magnitudes between the direct and 
indirect effects range from a ratio of about 10:1 to 3:1, suggesting that the opposing forces of the 
incentive alignment effect of disclosure are substantive enough to offset portion of the 
information effect. 
Our final set of analyses focuses on the systematic component of the cost of capital using 
portfolio regressions following Fama and French (1998). We employ two different ways of 
portfolio sorts. First, we form portfolios by intersecting ten groups sorted on disclosure quality 
with ten groups sorted on the basis of ownership. Second, we form portfolios by sorting firms 
within each country into five groups on the basis of ownership. For both portfolio strategies, we 
find that ownership and disclosure quality are negatively and significantly related to the 
systematic risk of the portfolio, measured either using realized returns or implied costs of capital. 
Path analyses indicate that the relative magnitudes of the direct and indirect effects of disclosure 
are similar to those from the firm-year regression analyses. 
                                                
3 We compute the indirect effect of disclosure by multiplying the disclosure coefficient from the ownership model 
with the ownership coefficient from the cost-of-capital model. We then compute the marginal effects (in basis 
points) as the respective coefficient estimates times the interquartile range of disclosure regulation (= 0.33). 
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Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways: First, we predict and show a 
negative relation between inside ownership and (systematic) cost of capital. This finding is 
related to prior work that documents a positive relation between ownership and firm value (e.g., 
La Porta et al., 2002). Since value is equal to future cash flows discounted by the cost of capital, 
a positive relation between ownership can result from increases in profitability as well as 
decreases in cost of capital. Our results suggest that the positive relation between ownership and 
firm value is at least partially driven by lowering the cost of capital. 
Second, we provide evidence of the direct and indirect effects of disclosure on the cost of 
capital. As such, our work is related to studies that examine the direct link between governance 
variables, broadly defined, and the cost of capital (e.g., Garmaise and Liu, 2004; Albuquerque 
and Wang, 2008; Attig et al., 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009; Hail and 
Leuz, 2009). For instance, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) use a sample of U.S. firms, and find a 
negative relation between proxies for the cost of capital, voluntary disclosure, and governance 
variables such as ownership. Attig et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2009) use samples of 
international firms, and find a negative relation between proxies for the cost of capital and 
governance attributes including ownership. Our study differs in that our main disclosure variable, 
defined as mandatory disclosure requirements at the country-level, is more plausibly exogenous, 
and that we model ownership as an endogenous function of disclosure quality. In addition, we 
show that the direct effect is negative whereas the indirect effect is positive, which attenuates the 
total negative relation between disclosure quality and the cost of capital. Finally, the results of 
our path analysis let us assess the relative importance of the information effect and the 
stewardship effect of disclosure.4 
                                                
4 Also related to our work is Himmelberg et al. (2004), which studies the relation between investor protection, inside 
ownership and the marginal return on capital. Our study differs from theirs in two important ways: First, 
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In Section 2 we develop the hypotheses drawing on the diverse theories linking 
disclosure quality, inside ownership, and the cost of capital. Section 3 describes the research 
design including our proxies for the cost of capital, the instrumental variables approach, and the 
path analyses. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
In this section, we develop predictions on the relation between disclosure quality and the 
cost of capital with an emphasis on the mediating role of inside ownership. Exhibit 1 illustrates 
the structural relations between our three constructs of disclosure, ownership, and cost of capital, 
and indicates the directional predictions. 
2.1. Effects of Disclosure Quality and Inside Ownership on the Cost of Capital 
As suggested in Lambert et al. (2007), disclosure quality can have two direct effects and 
one indirect effect on the systematic cost of capital. The first direct effect is an information effect 
and the second direct effect is a stewardship effect. The information effect occurs because 
disclosure quality reduces parameter uncertainty regarding the estimate of expected returns (e.g., 
Brown, 1979; Barry and Brown, 1984, 1985). Specifically, better disclosure improves investors’ 
prediction of future cash flows. Since more of the realization of future cash flows is known, the 
covariance between the firm’s cash flows and the cash flows of stocks in the market portfolio 
becomes lower, which in turn reduces firm beta and the cost of capital. This effect is not 
diversifiable because it is present for all covariance terms, and hence lowers systematic risk. 
Empirically, estimation risk predicts a negative relation between disclosure quality and the cost 
                                                                                                                                                       
Himmelberg et al.’s definition of cost of capital more closely captures project profitability whereas we focus on the 
expected systematic return required by shareholders. Second, Himmelberg et al. assume no direct effect of investor 
protection on cost of capital whereas we, in line with Lambert et al. (2007), study the direct and indirect effects of 
disclosure on cost of capital. 
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of capital but does not flow through the channel of inside ownership. This is illustrated as link L1 
in Exhibit 1. We note that this prediction from Lambert et al. (2007) is not without controversy. 
For example, Johnstone (2014) shows that if information also changes the assessments about the 
mean of firm value, the cost of capital can increase when information precision increases. As 
another example, Clinch and Verrecchia (2011) show that the cost of capital can increase if 
disclosure increases because of a voluntary choice (instead of a commitment to more 
transparency as shown in Lambert et al., 2007). Thus, the direction of the relation depicted in 
link L1 is ultimately an empirical question. 
Disclosure can have a second direct (stewardship) effect on the systematic cost of capital. 
This occurs because better disclosure improves monitoring and lowers the cost of incentive 
misalignment between corporate insiders and outsiders.5 The intuition for the direct stewardship 
effect of disclosure is as follows. Suppose that part of the misalignment cost is a fixed amount 
that is uncorrelated with cash flows, and the remainder is a variable amount that is perfectly 
correlated with cash flows. When the misalignment cost has this fixed/variable structure, 
disclosure quality is negatively related with the systematic cost of capital. The reason is that the 
fixed misalignment cost reduces expected cash flows, but has no effect on the covariance of a 
firm’s cash flows (CF) with the market cash flows (CFm). Hence, if disclosure reduces the fixed 
cost, the covariance of cash flows does not change, but the expected cash flows increase, and so 
does the firm price (P). Consequently, the covariance of firm returns (R) and market returns (Rm) 
decreases due to its inverse relation with the stock price (see Lambert et al., 2007, p. 390.): 
                                                
5 While misalignment costs are referred to as “misappropriation” in the Lambert et al. (2007) model, it is useful to 
note that three types of costs increase as managers become less aligned with outside shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; La Porta et al., 2002): managers may (i) misappropriate or steal, (ii) consume perquisites, or (iii) 
exert less effort. 
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 . (1) 
In other words, an increase in firm price P due to lower fixed misalignment costs reduces equity 
beta (assuming the covariance of cash flows is positive). This is illustrated as link L2 in Exhibit 
1. Empirically, both links L1 and L2 yield the same negative prediction of the effect of 
disclosure on cost of capital. 
It is important to note, however, that Lambert et al. (2007)’s fixed/variable assumption 
may not be descriptive. On the one hand, there is evidence supportive of this assumption. For 
instance, Baker and Hall (2004) find that managerial marginal products do not scale one-for-one 
with size. This finding suggests that misalignment has a fixed and a variable component, and that 
changes in misalignment do not translate one-to-one into changes in profits. Moreover, the 
fixed/variable assumption is equivalent to assuming that misalignment costs are greater in bad 
states because the opportunity costs of lost growth options are lower (Johnson et al., 2000; 
Lemmon and Lins, 2003). Similarly, Garmaise and Liu (2005) assume that because managers 
overinvest in both good states and bad states, proportional misalignment costs are higher in bad 
states. On the other hand, it is easy to imagine scenarios in which managers misappropriate more 
in good states, for example because there is more to appropriate in good states and thus it is less 
likely to be detected. Further, to the extent that takeovers occur more often in good states, 
takeover deterrents are more costly in good states. If misalignment costs are higher in good 
states, the logic above suggests a positive relation between disclosure and cost of capital. We 
thus caution that the stewardship effect in Lambert et al. is predicated on the assumption of 
larger proportional misalignment costs in bad states, and while this assumption is consistent with 
the majority of prior literature, some literature makes the opposite argument. 
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Given the stewardship effect of disclosure on the cost of capital, alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms, which also increase alignment (such as inside ownership), will mediate 
or substitute for the role of disclosure. This presents an additional indirect effect of disclosure on 
the cost of capital due to the substitute relation with inside ownership. The negative link between 
disclosure and ownership comes from agency models studying entrepreneurs’ trade-off between 
misalignment costs and the necessity to raise equity to fund projects (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; La Porta et al., 2002; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Doidge et al., 2004). In these papers, 
improved monitoring aligns entrepreneurs by increasing the probability of detection or the 
amount of penalties conditional on detection. When disclosure quality is low, the entrepreneur’s 
cost of shirking or consuming perquisites is low. Since the entrepreneur internalizes the costs of 
any misalignment when issuing equity, high inside ownership is the optimal contracting 
outcome. Thus, inside ownership becomes in essence a substitute for disclosure in aligning the 
entrepreneur (La Porta et al., 2002), represented as L3 in Exhibit 1.6 Because an increase in 
ownership increases alignment, there is also a negative relation between inside ownership and 
the cost of capital (L6 in Exhibit 1). In combination, the two links lead to an indirect stewardship 
effect of disclosure quality on the cost of capital through the channel of inside ownership that is 
positive. 
In addition to disclosure quality, other governance features (denoted “GOV” in Exhibit 1) 
can affect alignment. Similar to disclosure quality, GOV is expected to have a negative effect on 
systematic cost of capital, either directly via link L5 or indirectly via ownership (links L4 and L6 
for which we expect negative signs). Note that GOV can be factors such as investor protection 
                                                
6 In our discussion (following La Porta et al., 2002), we examine a firm owner and the effect of monitoring, and 
assume that higher “disclosure quality” leads to better monitoring. When monitoring improves, the entrepreneur 
owns less (sells more of the firm to outsiders). In standard agency models of the incentives of an employee of the 
firm owner, “disclosure quality” refers to the amount of noise in a performance measure. In this case, better 
disclosure quality leads to more incentives (more ownership by the employee). 
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and securities regulation that reduce misalignment (because of implicit or explicit penalties or 
because they help monitoring), but also factors like insider voting control that increase 
entrenchment. Consequently, ownership can substitute for other governance factors in lowering 
misappropriation. For instance, when legal protection is weak, we expect inside ownership to 
rise. 
2.2. Empirical Predictions 
To summarize, we discuss two direct channels through which disclosure can affect the 
systematic cost of capital—lower estimation risk and lower managerial misalignment. Because 
ownership (or other governance mechanisms) also affects misalignment, it arises as a substitute 
for disclosure giving rise to an indirect channel in which disclosure can affect the systematic cost 
of capital. This suggests the following three testable predictions: 
H1: Disclosure quality is negatively related to the systematic cost of capital (direct 
effect of disclosure). 
H2: Inside ownership is negatively related to the systematic cost of capital (direct effect 
of ownership). 
H3: Disclosure quality is positively related to the systematic cost of capital through the 
channel of inside ownership (indirect effect of disclosure). 
For the indirect effect in H3 to be positive, we implicitly assume (and test) that disclosure quality 
is negatively related to inside ownership (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Leuz et al., 2003; Haw et 
al., 2004). We do not have specific priors about the relative magnitude of the direct and indirect 
effects of disclosure on the systematic cost of capital. 
3. Research Design 
In this section we describe our research design. We begin with estimating a cost-of-
capital model in which proxies for the cost of capital are regressed on mandatory disclosure and 
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other determinants. We then introduce inside ownership into the model, and assess the relative 
magnitude of the direct and indirect disclosure effects using path analysis. In our second set of 
tests, we use a more direct proxy for the systematic component of the cost of capital using Fama 
and French (1998)-style portfolio regressions. 
3.1. Cross-Sectional, Time-Series Regressions of the Cost of Capital 
Our baseline regression model to investigate the relation between the cost of capital, 
mandated disclosure, and inside ownership is as follows: 
 COC = !0 + !1DQ + !2" + !3LEGAL+ # !iXi + $, (2) 
where COC is a proxy for the cost of capital, DQ is a measure of mandatory disclosure quality, " 
is a proxy for inside ownership, LEGAL is the effectiveness of the legal system, and Xi is a set of 
firm-level and country-level control variables. In all our regression analyses tabulated below, we 
cluster the standard errors at the country-level, which explicitly controls for cross-sectional and 
time-series dependence within a country (we obtain similar results when we apply two-way 
clustering of the standard errors by country and year). 
The coefficient !1 measures the direct effect of disclosure quality on the cost of capital. 
We expect this coefficient to be negative (H1). Our main hypothesis, H2, is that the effect of 
inside ownership on the cost of capital (i.e., the coefficient !2 in Eq. 2) will also be negative. For 
H3, we combine the coefficient !2 on inside ownership from the cost-of-capital model in Eq. (2) 
with the coefficient on disclosure quality from a model of the determinants of inside ownership 
(see the Appendix for details), and predict the product of these two coefficients to be positive. 
We use two proxies for the cost of capital. First, we follow Hail and Leuz (2006) and 
employ the average implied cost of capital estimate from four different accounting-based 
valuation models suggested in Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), Ohlson and 
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Juettner-Nauroth (2005), and Easton (2004). The basic idea of all four models is to substitute 
price and analyst forecasts into a valuation equation and to back out the cost of capital as the 
internal rate of return that equates current stock price with the expected future sequence of 
residual incomes or abnormal earnings.7 Since the estimation of these models does not rely on a 
long time series of data and also does not take a stance on market integration, they are 
particularly suited for a cross-country setting (e.g., Lee et al., 2007; Pástor et al., 2008). Our 
second cost of capital proxy is realized returns. We compute annualized buy-and-hold returns in 
US$ over the 12-month period starting ten months after the end of the fiscal year. The use of 
month +10 after the fiscal year-end is for consistency with the implied costs of capital. Both our 
proxies of cost of capital have advantages and disadvantages and, by testing our hypotheses 
across two independent measures, we show that our results are not driven by a particular 
variable. 
Our proxy for Disclosure Regulation (DQ) follows La Porta et al. (2006) and captures 
cross-country differences in disclosure requirements in securities offerings. This variable is 
based on a questionnaire distributed to security-law attorneys in 49 countries as of December 
2000. The questionnaire surveys several aspects of disclosure in security offerings such as 
prospectus requirements, directors’ compensation, ownership structure, inside ownership, 
related-party transactions, etc. We focus on the disclosure requirements index as this variable 
                                                
7 More specifically, we obtain financial data from Worldscope, and analyst forecasts and share price information 
from I/B/E/S. We require each observation to have a one-year-ahead and a two-year-ahead, non-negative earnings 
forecast, and either a long-term growth forecast or a three-year-ahead earnings forecast. We measure financial data 
as of the fiscal year end and analyst forecasts and stock prices as of month +10 after the end of the fiscal year. This 
allows for the financial information to be publicly available and impounded in price by the time of the cost of capital 
imputation. For details on the estimation procedure see the appendix of Hail and Leuz (2006). 
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arguably captures differences in countries’ mandatory disclosure rules, and at the same time can 
be assumed exogenous to firms’ actual reporting practices.8 
We proxy for Inside Ownership (") using the Worldscope variable “closely held shares,” 
which represents the percentage of shares held by corporate insiders and others.9 This measure 
has been widely used in the past (e.g., La Porta et al., 2002) and is available for a large 
international cross-section of firms. Yet, the measure might be noisy, as it captures not only 
inside ownership but also shares held by blockholders. It also does not distinguish between the 
alignment and the entrenchment effects of ownership, which is why we include controls for 
entrenchment in the model.10 Since the ownership measure is bounded between 0 and 100 
percent, we follow Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Himmelberg et al. (1999), and use the logit 
transformed version in the analyses, that is, ln(x/(1–x)) where x is the raw value. This 
transformation improves the empirical properties of the variable by changing it to an unbounded 
range while at the same time ensuring that the predicted values from an OLS regression fall 
within 0 and 100 percent. 
We measure Legal Quality (LEGAL) by using the rule of law index from La Porta et al. 
(1997). This variable is positively correlated with Disclosure Regulation. By controlling for the 
overall quality of the legal system, we mitigate concerns that our findings are driven by 
institutional factors other than mandatory disclosure, and also allow for the substitute relation 
                                                
8 We note that there are ways for firms in a given country to opt out of a mandatory disclosure regime, e.g., by 
delisting or cross-listing its shares abroad (e.g., Bushee and Leuz, 2005; Hail and Leuz, 2009). However, the 
proportion of these firms is generally small, so that our assumption of exogenous mandatory disclosure rules seems 
reasonable for the vast majority of sample firms. A remaining issue is whether securities regulation itself is 
endogenous because countries might choose their securities regulation to obtain certain outcomes. 
9 Because “closely held shares” includes shares owned by non-insiders, it is arguably a noisy proxy of inside 
ownership. Worldscope defines closely held shares (Field 05475) as including shares held by officers, directors and 
their immediate families, shares of the company held by any other corporations, and shares held by individuals who 
hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares. We convert this variable to a percentage by dividing it by the number of 
common shares outstanding (Field 05301). 
10 We use the existence of multiple share classes (Multiple Shares), firms’ dividend payout ratio (Payout Ratio), and 
the number of analysts following a firm (Analyst Following) as our proxies for entrenchment. See the Appendix and 
Section 4.2 for details. 
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between inside ownership and other governance mechanisms aside from disclosure regulation (as 
denoted by the GOV variable in Exhibit 1).11 
The remaining control variables comprise Market Value and the Book-to-Market ratio, 
which act as firm characteristics explaining the cross-section of expected returns (Fama and 
French, 1992).12 In addition, when analyzing the implied cost of capital, we control for the 
volatility in earnings per share over the last five years (Earnings Variability) and the one-year-
ahead analyst forecast error (Forecast Bias). These variables are intended to control for biases in 
analysts’ forecasts used to impute the implied costs of capital (McInnis, 2010; Guay et al., 2011). 
We further control for Inflation because analyst forecasts are expressed in nominal terms, and 
hence reflect the expected inflation rates. Finally, we include industry and year fixed-effects 
throughout the analyses.13 See the notes to Table 2 for details on the variable measurement. 
3.2. Fama-French Portfolio Sorts of (Systematic) Cost of Capital 
In addition to the firm-specific regressions above, we use a more direct way to compute 
the systematic cost of capital using portfolio level regressions on Fama and French (1998) factors 
after sorting on ownership and disclosure regulation.14 The main advantage of the portfolio 
methodology is that firm-level estimates of factor loadings are noisy (Fama and Macbeth, 1973). 
                                                
11 Two advantages of the La Porta et al. (1997) measure are that it focuses on investor protection and predates most 
of our sample period, which mitigates endogeneity concerns. However, because the measure is older, it might 
capture the quality of the legal regime with error. As an alternative, we repeat our analyses with the measure of rule 
of law from Kaufmann et al. (2007) which is time-varying and more recently measured, but captures a broader 
notion of rule of law encompassing “contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2011). Using this alternative proxy for Legal Quality, our 
results are largely unaffected. 
12 We note that Lambert et al. (2007) is based on a single-factor CAPM model. Intuitively, though, their predictions 
extend to multi-factor models, and we apply them to systematic risk from a multi-factor model including size, book-
to-market, etc. 
13 We do not include country fixed-effects because our measure of mandatory disclosure is time-invariant and 
measured at the country level. However, to gauge the results on insider ownership (a time-varying measure available 
at the firm level), we repeat our analyses after substituting country fixed-effects for the disclosure variable (and the 
legal quality variable). We find that our inferences on ownership are unaffected by this choice. 
14 All sorting on ownership utilizes the predicted values from our ownership model as outlined in the Appendix. This 
accounts for the potentially endogenous nature of ownership. 
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By grouping firms into portfolios we increase the precision of our estimates of the systematic 
cost of capital. The potential downside of this approach is that it reduces the cross-sectional 
variation in ownership and disclosure to the variation across portfolios. 
We conduct two different sorts in the portfolio analyses. In the first, we rank and sort 
firms independently into ten groups on the basis of disclosure quality and into ten groups on the 
basis of inside ownership. We then form portfolios based on the intersection. This results in 84 
disclosure quality-ownership portfolios with at least 60 monthly return observations out of 100 
possible portfolios (ten times ten). The 16 empty portfolios (on the off-diagonal) reflect the 
negative correlation between disclosure quality and ownership. In the second sort, we rank and 
sort firms within each country into five groups on the basis of ownership. We again require each 
of these country-ownership portfolios to contain at least 60 monthly return observations, 
resulting in 169 portfolios. In both cases, we perform the sorts each year, so that a firm may 
move across portfolios as its ownership changes. 
We form portfolios in October of each year t+1.15 We match twelve months of stock 
returns to each firm-year and, on a monthly basis, compute returns to an equal-weighted portfolio 
with annual rebalancing (i.e., a “buy-and-hold” portfolio). We use equal weights because our 
hypotheses are about the expected returns for a typical or average stock. We rebalance annually 
to mitigate concerns that frequent rebalancing of an equal-weight portfolio can produce biased 
estimates of realized returns due to the bid-ask bounce (Blume and Stambaugh, 1983). We then 
estimate the following time-series regression for each portfolio: 
 RP,t - RF,t = ap + b1,p (RM,t - RF,t) + b2,p HMLt + $p,t. (3) 
                                                
15 We choose October because most of our firms have a December fiscal year end. This timing is consistent with the 
timing of our measure of implied cost of capital, which is measured at month +10 after a firm’s fiscal-year end. 
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where RP,t is the portfolio return, RF,t is the return on a one-month U.S. Treasury Bill, RM,t is a 
value-weighted world market index return from Datastream, and HMLt is the Fama and French 
(1998) value-weighted global book-to-market factor. Fama and French (1998, p. 1975) show that 
the above two-factor model “captures the value premium in international returns.” Next, we 
calculate the systematic risk of the portfolio using the fitted coefficients  and . 
Specifically, we estimate the following: 
 
 
SysRET = ˆ b 1,pR M + ˆ b 2,p HML , (4) 
In Eq. (4),  and 
 
HML  are the average values of RM,t and HMLt for our full sample period. 
The foregoing approach uses the average values of RM,t and HMLt as estimates of the 
global market and HML expected risk premiums. In our firm-year analysis, we use both implied 
cost of capital estimates and realized returns as proxies for the cost of capital. Arguments in 
Elton (1999) and others suggest that realized returns can provide noisy estimates of expected risk 
premiums, which can be partially addressed by using implied cost of capital (Pástor et al., 2008). 
We therefore also re-calculate Eq. (4) using average implied cost of capital estimates (ICC) as 
proxies of the expected risk premiums: 
 
 
SysICC = ˆ b 1,pR M ,ICC + ˆ b 2,p HMLICC .16 (5) 
Finally, to test our hypotheses, we regress the systematic cost of capital from the portfolio 
approach (i.e., SysRET and SysICC) on disclosure regulation, inside ownership and, depending on 
the specification, various control variables in a model similar to the one presented in Eq. (2). 
                                                
16 We calculate the average ICC risk premiums analogous to Fama-French (1998). Specifically, 
 
R M ,ICC  is the 
average annual ICC market expected return, and we calculate the ICC market expected return for the year as the 
value-weighted ICC for all firms in the Fama-French countries for which we have ICC data that year. To create the 
HML expected risk premium using ICC, we form book-to-market (BM) deciles by sorting firms in the Fama-French 
countries each year on BM. We then calculate the HML expected return each year as the difference between the 
value-weighted ICC of the sample firms in the three highest BM deciles and the value-weighted ICC of the sample 
firms in the three lowest BM deciles. 
 
HMLICC  is the average annual HML expected return. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Sample Selection and Description 
Our sample consists of all firms with accounting data available in Worldscope, stock 
price data from Datastream, and analyst data from I/B/E/S. We eliminate (i) countries with less 
than ten individual firms, (ii) country-years with an inflation rate above 25%, and (iii) firm-year 
observations with market values below US$ five million. In addition, we require all firms to have 
information on inside ownership, implied cost of capital, realized returns, mandated disclosure, 
and the control variables. This way we can more directly compare the results across the two 
dependent variables since the sample is held constant. The final sample consists of 50,201 firm-
year observations from 35 countries over the 1990 to 2004 period. We end the sample period in 
2004 to avoid the potentially mitigating effects of changes in disclosure regulation on the cost of 
capital around the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 for many of our sample countries (e.g., 
Daske et al., 2008). 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the number of observations, the cost of capital, 
inside ownership, disclosure regulation, legal quality, and other macroeconomic factors by 
country. The average implied cost of capital (realized return) equals 10.95% (13.66%) with a 
lower bound of 8.2% (-8.9%) and an upper bound of 16.5% (27.7%). The average inside 
ownership equals 29.9%, with substantial cross-sectional variation (ranging from about 20% in 
the U.K. and U.S. to more than 70% in the Philippines). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for 
the dependent and independent variables used in the cost-of-capital model. The table notes 
provide details on the data sources and the variable measurement. 
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4.2. Determinants of Cost of Capital Using Cross-Sectional, Time-Series Regressions 
4.2.1. Implied cost of capital as the dependent variable 
Table 3, Panel A, presents results on the determinants of the cost of capital when we use 
the implied cost of capital as a proxy for expected returns. The first model follows Hail and Leuz 
(2006) in which cost of capital is a function of disclosure regulation, legal quality, inflation, and 
the firm-level control variables, but without including inside ownership. The results indicate a 
significantly negative relation between disclosure regulation and cost of capital, consistent with 
the direct information and/or monitoring effect of disclosure. The coefficient on the legal quality 
variable is also negative, but not significant at conventional levels in this specification. Cost of 
capital is negatively related to firm size and positively associated with inflation, book-to-market, 
earnings variability, and forecast bias. Overall, the results are in line with Hail and Leuz (2006). 
Next, in Column (2), we add the inside ownership variable, and find a negative relation 
between inside ownership and the implied cost of capital. This is consistent with our main 
hypothesis that inside ownership, by increasing managerial alignment, reduces the cost of 
capital. At the same time, the relation between disclosure and cost of capital (as well as the 
relation between legal quality and cost of capital) becomes more pronounced, suggesting that the 
inclusion of ownership mitigates the hypothesized positive indirect effect of disclosure quality on 
the cost of capital. 
One concern with our specification in Column (2) is that inside ownership not only 
measures incentive alignment (via the cash flow rights held by corporate insiders), but can also 
capture managerial entrenchment (because share ownership conveys voting rights as well as cash 
flow rights). To control for these entrenchment effects, and in the absence of a perfect proxy for 
voting rights in our large panel, we include in Column (3) three additional firm-level variables to 
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isolate the entrenchment effect. Multiple Shares indicates the existence of multiple share classes 
thereby facilitating the separation of ownership and control. The Payout Ratio, measured as 
dividends per share divided by earnings per share, controls for the potential of shareholder 
expropriation. Finally, we include the number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for the firm 
(Analyst Following) as a proxy for outside monitoring. Adding these variables to the model 
slightly reduces the significance level of disclosure regulation (t-statistic of -1.66 and p-value of 
10.6%) but has little or no effect on ownership and legal quality. 
Another concern is that ownership may be endogenous to the cost of capital. That is, at 
the time of the IPO the entrepreneur chooses ownership to maximize offering proceeds, thereby 
reducing misalignment costs. The counter-argument, though, is that while ownership is 
admittedly endogenous at the IPO date, it is arguably exogenous in subsequent years (La Porta et 
al., 2002).17 In the Appendix, we describe two approaches of developing instrumental variables 
for ownership. We then use these models in a two-stage estimation (2SLS) that attempts to 
control for the endogenous nature of ownership. In Column (4) we present the 2SLS results using 
the basic ownership model in the first stage as outlined in the first column of Table A2 in the 
Appendix. In Column (5) we use an IPO model, i.e., we determine ownership as of the IPO date 
of the firm (see the second column in Table A2). For both specifications the coefficients on 
inside ownership and disclosure regulation are negative and statistically significant. This finding 
suggests that inside ownership, when endogenously determined or optimized at the time of the 
IPO, remains negatively associated with implied cost of capital.18 The 2SLS estimation also 
                                                
17 La Porta et al. (2002) justify this assumption as follows (p. 1165): “Our defense of this assumption is that, 
generally speaking, ownership patterns are extremely stable, especially outside the United States, and are shaped 
largely by histories of the companies and their founding families.” 
18 Following Larcker and Rusticus (2010), we conduct tests to assess the appropriateness of the 2SLS methodology. 
We estimate the partial F-statistic for our set of five instruments in the first stage, and find an F-statistic of 19.92. 
Comparing this value to the 15.09 suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (p. 192) indicates that our instruments, if 
valid, are less likely to suffer from a “weak instrument” problem. 
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increases the coefficient magnitude and the statistical significance of the disclosure regulation 
(and legal quality) variable in line with the substitute role of ownership for disclosure. 
Finally, in Column (6), we show OLS results when we aggregate the 50,201 firm-year 
observations into 382 country-year observations by computing medians. Following Hail and 
Leuz (2006), this specification accounts for the fact that disclosure regulation only varies at the 
country level. The estimated coefficients are largely consistent with those shown for the other 
regressions, although inside ownership becomes only marginally significant (t-statistic of -1.49). 
In order to assess the relative magnitude of the direct and indirect effects of disclosure, 
we next estimate a path model that follows the structural relations outlined in Exhibit 1. We 
report results for the main coefficients of interest in Panel B of Table 3. To enable comparisons 
across the ownership model and the cost-of-capital model, we standardize all coefficient 
estimates, i.e., we multiply the regression coefficients by the ratio of the standard deviation of 
the dependent variable to the standard deviation of the regressor (Bushee and Noe, 2000). The 
direct effect of disclosure is the standardized coefficient on disclosure regulation from the cost-
of-capital model (i.e., the coefficient !1 in Eq. 2). For our main specification as reported in 
Column (3) of Panel A this effect equals -0.056. Using the standard deviation of the implied cost 
of capital of 3.56%, this estimate suggests a 20 basis points decrease in the cost of capital for a 
one-standard-deviation increase in disclosure quality. We calculate the indirect effect of 
disclosure by multiplying the standardized %1 coefficient on disclosure regulation from the 
ownership model (Eq. a1 in the Appendix) with the standardized !2 coefficient on ownership 
from the cost-of-capital model (Eq. 2). The resulting estimate of 0.012 (= -0.217 ! -0.053) 
suggests a positive effect of 4 basis points for a one-standard-deviation increase in disclosure 
quality (= 0.012 ! 3.56%). Thus, in this specification, the direct effect of disclosure quality 
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outweighs the indirect effect by a ratio of about 5:1. For the 2SLS model and the country-year 
regression also depicted in Panel B of Table 3, the relative magnitudes are on the order of 2.3:1 
and 11:1, respectively. 
4.2.2. Realized annual returns as the dependent variable 
Table 4 presents the results for the determinants of the cost of capital when using realized 
returns as a proxy. With respect to the risk controls, realized returns are negatively related to firm 
size and positively associated with book-to-market, consistent with Fama and French (1992). 
Regarding our main variables of interest, the coefficients on disclosure regulation and inside 
ownership are generally not statistically significant in the OLS regressions, contrasting the 
implied cost of capital results. We note, however, that the coefficients on disclosure regulation 
and ownership become negative and, in the latter case, significant in the OLS regression when 
we drop extreme annualized buy-and-hold return observations (i.e., above or below 50%). These 
coefficients both become significantly negative when we exclude observations from the United 
States from the sample. These findings are consistent with realized returns being a noisy proxy of 
expected risk premiums (Elton, 1999). Moreover, in the country-year specification reported in 
Column (6), disclosure regulation and inside ownership are negatively related to realized returns, 
but only significant at the 13% level (t-statistic of -1.56). 
Yet, when we account for the endogenous nature of ownership, both the disclosure 
regulation and inside ownership variables become significantly negatively related to realized 
returns. Specifically, we find a significantly negative relation between “predicted” ownership 
and realized returns in the two 2SLS regressions in Columns (4) and (5). Further, disclosure 
regulation also becomes negatively related to the cost of capital. These results are in line with the 
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implied cost of capital findings and underscore the importance of controlling for the underlying 
determinants of ownership. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports results from the path analysis for realized returns. The 
interpretation of the direct effect in the OLS firm-year specification is not sensible as the 
coefficient is insignificant. For 2SLS and the country-year analysis, though, the direct effect is 
negative and, in the case of the aggregate analysis, comparable in relative magnitude to the 
implied cost of capital results. The indirect effects of disclosure are all positive and the 
standardized coefficient estimates range from 0.001 (= -0.217 ! -0.006) to 0.065 (= -0.214 ! 
-0.302). These estimates result in a ratio between the direct and indirect effects of disclosure of 
almost 1:1 and 1:4 in the 2SLS model and the country-year specification, respectively. 
Taken together, consistent with the predictions in Lambert et al. (2007), we find that 
disclosure quality has a direct effect on the cost of capital. In addition, we show that the indirect 
stewardship effect is positive, attenuating the total negative relation between disclosure quality 
and the cost of capital. While the total effect continues to be negative when using implied cost of 
capital, it has a substantially smaller (in some specifications even zero) net effect with realized 
returns. 
4.2.3. Sensitivity analyses 
We conduct several sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of our findings. First, we 
assess the sensitivity of the disclosure variable to firms voluntarily adopting another set of 
accounting standards than local GAAP. Specifically, in many countries firms could voluntarily 
adopt IAS/IFRS during our sample period, which has been shown to go along with cost of capital 
benefits when firms were serious about their commitment to more transparency (Daske et al., 
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2013).19 We control for the potentially mitigating effects of this voluntary accounting choice by 
(i) excluding voluntary IAS/IFRS adopting firms from the sample, or (ii) including an indicator 
variable marking firm-years with voluntary IAS/IFRS reporting in the model. In both cases, the 
results are very similar to those reported in the text and none of our inferences changes. Thus, 
our findings seem not confounded by voluntary IAS/IFRS adoptions. 
Second, we assess the impact of the sample composition on our results, namely the effect 
of the three largest sample countries. As indicated in Table 1, U.S. firms comprise almost 50% of 
the sample, whereas firm-year observations from the U.K. and Japan account for about 10% and 
7% of the sample. Thus, it is possible that our results might be overrepresented by the firms in 
these countries. Dropping the U.S. observations reduces the significance levels of the 2SLS 
estimation when using the implied cost of capital as the dependent variable, but strengthens the 
realized returns results. Notably, in the OLS regressions the coefficients on disclosure regulation 
and ownership become significantly negative in Column (3) of Table 4. When we retain the U.S., 
but drop the U.K., the implied cost of capital results become stronger in the OLS estimation: all 
the disclosure and ownership coefficients are significantly negative, including those in the 
country-year regression, but the 2SLS models are insignificant. The realized returns analyses are 
similar to those reported. Excluding Japanese firms also strengthens the implied cost of capital 
results, and for one exception (the coefficient on ownership in Column 6) all disclosure, 
ownership, and legal quality coefficients are negative and significant. The realized returns results 
are similar to before. Overall, our findings seem not greatly affected by the large sample 
countries; if anything, the full sample analyses produce slightly weaker results than after 
excluding any of the three countries. 
                                                
19 In 2001, IAS were renamed IFRS and thus our sample comprises both firms with voluntary IAS and IFRS 
reporting. Note that we stop our sample in 2004, that is, before the bulk of mandatory IFRS adoption took place. 
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Finally, and still related to the sample composition, we re-run the analyses with the 
largest realized returns sample possible. That is, instead of holding the sample constant across 
both dependent variables, we utilize all realized returns observations with available data. 
Because we do not require analyst forecasts, we can expand the sample to 158,034 firm-year 
observations, thereby mitigating potential selection bias. Expanding our sample does not 
substantially affect the results and none of the inferences changes. 
4.3. Determinants of Systematic Cost of Capital Using Fama-French Portfolio Sorts 
Table 5 presents the results on the determinants of the systematic cost of capital. We 
estimate the beta coefficients on the world market portfolio and on the world HML portfolio 
using portfolio-level regressions of Eq. (3) above. We then estimate the cost of capital by 
multiplying the beta coefficients with the average sample risk premiums. Panels A and B present 
results for the average realized returns and implied costs of capital using the systematic risk as 
estimated in Eq. (4) and (5), respectively. 
The first two columns of each panel report results for the 84 portfolios formed when we 
rank and sort firms independently into ten groups on the basis of disclosure quality and predicted 
ownership. We compute our test variables by averaging ownership and disclosure regulation for 
each portfolio over the time period of the portfolio.20 We apply the same procedure to the control 
variables. Column (1) shows results for the test variables and legal quality only. Consistent with 
our hypothesis, ownership is significantly negatively related to systematic risk. Disclosure 
regulation and legal quality are also negative and significant. Results across the two dependent 
variables are similar. 
                                                
20 We require portfolios to have 60 months (five years) of data. Most portfolios have 180 months (15 years) of data. 
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In Column (2), we add the three controls for entrenchment (i.e., multiple shares, payout 
ratio, analyst following) and, in Panel B, the controls for biases in the implied cost of capital 
(i.e., inflation, forecast bias, and earnings variability). The entrenchment controls are 
insignificant for the realized returns specification, but are significant with the expected signs in 
the implied cost of capital regression. That is, consistent with an entrenchment interpretation, the 
cost of capital is positively associated with multiple shares, and negatively with the payout ratio 
and analyst following. The main results are not affected by this model expansion. 
The third and fourth columns of each panel report results for the 169 portfolios formed 
when we sort firms within each country into five groups on the basis of predicted ownership. The 
results are generally weaker than those using the previous sorting algorithm. This likely reflects 
our sort design, which generates more variation in ownership than it does in disclosure 
regulation. In Column (3), consistent with our hypothesis, ownership is significantly negatively 
related to systematic cost of capital. The coefficient on disclosure regulation is also negative and 
significant (as is the coefficient on legal quality). Adding the control variables reduces the 
statistical power, and only the ownership and disclosure variables are significant in the implied 
cost of capital specification. None of the entrenchment variables are significant. 
To assess the relative magnitude of the direct and indirect effects of disclosure on the 
systematic cost of capital, we repeat the path analysis for the Fama-French portfolio sorts and 
report results in Panel C of Table 5. We use the model specification without controls as basis for 
the computations (i.e., Columns 1 and 3 in Panels A and B). We estimate the direct effect of 
disclosure as the standardized coefficient on disclosure regulation from the cost-of-capital 
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model.21 The indirect effect is the product of the standardized coefficient on disclosure regulation 
in the ownership model (see Table A2 in the Appendix) and the standardized coefficient of 
ownership in the cost-of-capital model. The total effect is the sum of the two. 
Focusing on systematic realized returns, the direct effect of disclosure equals -0.44 in the 
two-way sorts and -0.27 in the one-way sorts. Since the annual standard deviation of systematic 
realized returns is 2.02% (2.72%) for the one-way (two-way) sorts, this estimate suggests an 89 
(73) basis points decrease in the cost of capital for a one-standard-deviation increase in 
disclosure quality. The indirect effect, on the other hand, is positive for both sorts, consistent 
with a substitute relation between disclosure and ownership. Specifically, an increase in 
disclosure is associated with a reduction in ownership. However, because reduced ownership 
increases misalignment, higher disclosure increases the systematic cost of capital via ownership. 
As a result, the total effect of disclosure equals -0.35 in the two-way sorts (-0.22 in the one-way 
sorts), suggesting a 71 (60) basis points net decrease in the systematic cost of capital for a one-
standard-deviation increase in disclosure quality (after accounting for the positive indirect effects 
of 17 and 14 basis points in the two specifications, respectively). Consistent with our findings 
above, these estimates suggest a relative magnitude of the direct and indirect effects of disclosure 
on the order of 5:1. 
For systematic implied cost of capital, the total effects are slightly smaller. The 
standardized coefficient on disclosure equals -0.53 in the two-way sorts (-0.36 in the one-way 
sorts). Since the annual standard deviation of systematic implied cost of capital is 1.02% (1.24%) 
for the one-way (two-way) sorts, this estimate suggests a 54 (45) basis points net decrease in the 
cost of capital for a one-standard-deviation increase in disclosure quality. The direct information 
                                                
21 To compute standardized coefficients, we standardize each dependent and independent variable (by subtracting its 
mean and dividing by its standard deviation) so that that the variables have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 
one, and re-run each regression. This transformation does not affect the t-statistic. 
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effect of disclosure outweighs the indirect stewardship effect by a ratio of about 6:1, and again 
these numbers are very similar to those found in the firm-level regression analyses. 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we provide evidence for the stewardship effect of disclosure, and how it 
interrelates with other governance mechanisms also affecting stewardship. Following Lambert et 
al. (2007), we hypothesize that disclosure can have a direct and an indirect effect on the cost of 
capital, with the indirect (stewardship) effect flowing through governance mechanisms such as 
inside ownership. In addition, ownership can directly affect the systematic cost of capital due to 
lower incentive misalignment (e.g., La Porta et al., 2002). 
We test these hypotheses on a sample of 50,201 firm-year observations from 35 countries 
between 1990 and 2004. We begin by confirming prior findings that disclosure quality is 
negatively related to the cost of capital (Hail and Leuz, 2006). Next, we examine the role of 
ownership, and find that it is significantly negatively related to the cost of capital. Further, 
because ownership is also negatively related to disclosure quality, it serves as a substitute to 
lowering misalignment costs through disclosure. When we compute the direct and indirect 
effects of disclosure on the cost of capital, we find that while the first effect is negative the 
second effect is positive. Greater disclosure quality reduces ownership, which in turn increases 
incentive misalignment and the cost of capital. Results from our path analysis suggest that the 
direct effect of disclosure quality outweighs the indirect effect by a ratio of, on average, about 
five to one. Our final set of tests employs Fama and French-style portfolio regressions sorted on 
ownership and disclosure regulation and finds evidence consistent with the firm-specific 
analyses. 
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Our results make several contributions to the literature. First, we predict and show a 
negative relation between ownership and cost of capital. Prior literature documents a positive 
relation between ownership and firm value. We extend this literature by suggesting that this 
finding is at least partially driven by decreases in the cost of capital due to lower misalignment 
costs. Second, we provide evidence of the direct and indirect effects of disclosure on the cost of 
capital. Specifically, we show that the direct effect is negative whereas the indirect effect is 
positive, thereby attenuating the total negative relation between disclosure quality and the cost of 
capital. Finally, we assess the relative importance of the information effect and the stewardship 
effect of disclosure for the systematic cost of capital using path analysis. While prior theory 
suggests these complex relations between disclosure, inside ownership, and the cost of capital, 
empirical evidence of these effects is scarce. 
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Appendix: Determinants of Inside Ownership 
In this appendix we discuss a model of inside ownership. This model serves several 
purposes. First, by modeling ownership as a function of disclosure, we are able to estimate the 
indirect stewardship effect of disclosure on the cost of capital through the channel of inside 
ownership (see Exhibit 1). Second, it allows us to use this model as a first-stage prediction model 
in the 2SLS estimation presented in Tables 3 and 4. Finally, we can use it to confirm prior 
evidence of a negative relation between disclosure quality and inside ownership for our cost-of-
capital sample (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Leuz et al., 2003; Haw et al., 2004). 
We model inside ownership " as a function of mandatory disclosure (DQ), the overall 
quality of the legal system (LEGAL), and a set of firm-level and country-level control variables 
Zi. This results in the following regression specification: 
 " = %0 + %1DQ + %2LEGAL + #%iZi + u. (a1) 
We use the same proxies for Inside Ownership, Disclosure Regulation, and Legal Quality 
as in our cost-of-capital model (see Section 3.1). The choice of the control variables follows 
prior research (e.g., Himmelberg et al., 1999, 2004; La Porta et al., 1998, 2002). We expect 
inside ownership to be a function of log(Sales), the ratio of sales to property, plant and 
equipment (Sales/PPE), the ratio of research and development expense to sales (R&D/Sales), and 
the idiosyncratic volatility of monthly stock returns (Return Variability). Because R&D 
information is often missing, we also include a binary R&D Indicator, which takes on the value 
of one for firm-years without valid R&D information. To account for nonlinearities in the 
relation between ownership and size, we include log(Sales)2 in the model. In addition, we control 
for (the logarithm of) the annual gross domestic product (GDP). Wealthier nations have more 
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large firms that are widely held. At the same time, GDP might also capture entrepreneurial 
wealth, which is an important (unobserved) determinant of ownership (Bitler et al., 2005). 
Our dependent variable measures the percentage of cash flow rights held by insiders. 
However, it is possible that it also captures managerial entrenchment since the voting rights and 
cash flow rights of shares are correlated. In the absence of a perfect proxy for voting rights in our 
large panel, we include the same three additional firm-level variables to isolate the entrenchment 
effect as in the cost-of-capital model (i.e., Multiple Shares, the Payout Ratio, and Analyst 
Following). Finally, we include industry and year fixed-effects. See Table A1 for descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in the ownership model and details on the variable measurement. 
One concern with our main analysis is the potentially endogenous nature of inside 
ownership. To estimate a 2SLS regression, we need instruments that determine ownership but 
are not included in the cost-of-capital model in Eq. (2). We attempt to address this issue in two 
ways. First, we include in the ownership model proxies for the volatility of a risk-averse 
manager’s stake in the firm (i.e., Sales/PPE, R&D/Sales, return variability, and countries’ GDP). 
Thus, we implicitly assume that these measures are valid instruments based on the idea that they 
likely capture innate firm volatility, managerial risk aversion, and managerial wealth. A concern 
with this approach is that some of our instruments (e.g., R&D) are arguably endogenous. Thus, 
as an alternative, we follow La Porta et al. (2002) and assume that ownership is optimized at the 
time of the initial offering of shares (IPO). Specifically, we set our determinants of ownership 
equal to the actual realizations of these variables in the first year a firm enters the sample (our 
proxy for the IPO year), and subsequently eliminate this first year from the analyses when 
estimating the cost-of-capital model. The idea is that, by measuring the instrumental variables at 
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the beginning of the sample period, they sufficiently predate the years in which we measure the 
cost of capital, and thus are less likely to be chosen in anticipation of future equity capital needs. 
Table A2 presents three specifications of the ownership model. In the first column, we 
use the same firm-year observations as in the cost-of-capital model. In the second column, we 
estimate the IPO model as described above (note that we lose about 10,000 firm-years because 
we eliminate the first year a firm enters the sample). In the third column, we aggregate the firm-
years into 382 country-year observations by computing medians for continuous variables and 
means for binary indicator variables. This aggregation addresses the concerns that large sample 
countries might unduly affect the results, and that the statistical significance of the institutional 
variables measured at the country level might be overstated. For all regressions, we report t-
statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by country. 
Regardless of the model, disclosure regulation is always significantly and negatively 
related to inside ownership. This finding is consistent with the idea that ownership serves as a 
substitute to disclosure regulation in preventing managers from expropriating outside/minority 
shareholders. Thus, when we multiply the negative coefficient %1 from Eq. (a1) with a negative 
coefficient on inside ownership in the cost-of-capital model, the resulting indirect effect of 
disclosure on the cost of capital is positive. 
The control variables are generally significant and exhibit the expected signs (less so for 
the country-year specification). The coefficients on log(Sales) and log(Sales)2 suggest a concave 
relation between firm size and ownership that is decreasing except for small values of sales. This 
is consistent with better monitoring for larger firms. It is also consistent with larger firms having 
higher shareholder protection, which reduces the likelihood of incentive misalignment. Inside 
ownership is positively associated with the sales to capital ratio (although the coefficients are 
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often insignificant). To the extent that this measure is a proxy for (the inverse of) asset 
tangibility, it suggests that ownership is lower when there are more fixed assets. Higher R&D is 
associated with lower inside ownership. One possible explanation for this (counter-intuitive) 
result is that firms with higher R&D intensity might be more exposed to idiosyncratic risk, 
lowering the incentives for managers to hold equity (Himmelberg et al., 2004). The positive sign 
on return variability suggests that idiosyncratic risk may not proxy for risk that lowers inside 
ownership, but for uncertainty and monitoring difficulty that increases inside ownership. The 
three entrenchment variables suggest that insiders of firms with multiple shares hold more equity 
(consistent with higher agency problems), and that higher payout ratios and analyst following 
reduce the need for incentive alignment via ownership. Finally, firms in wealthier countries and 
from countries with more effective legal systems have lower inside ownership. 
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Exhibit 1.  Structural relations between disclosure regulation, inside ownership, and cost of capital 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The graph depicts the structural relations between disclosure quality or other governance factors and systematic cost of capital, either directly (dotted 
lines) or indirectly via inside ownership (solid lines). Rectangles represent exogenous and endogenous variables, arrows stand for stipulated causal relations, 
and rounded boxes indicate the underlying theoretical argument. We also indicate the direction of the causal relations. 
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Table 1.  Sample composition and descriptive statistics by country 
Country Unique  firms 
Firm- 
years 
Implied cost 
of capital 
Realized 
returns 
Inside 
ownership 
Disclosure 
regulation 
Legal  
quality Log(GDP) Inflation 
Argentina 11 30 12.41 -8.91 58.02 0.50 0.53 12.54 0.10 
Australia 361 1,563 10.95 13.41 33.23 0.75 1.00 12.84 2.52 
Austria 33 117 11.34 20.49 53.74 0.25 1.00 12.12 1.84 
Belgium 77 384 11.33 10.86 51.19 0.42 1.00 12.30 1.87 
Brazil 59 110 16.50 22.73 49.51 0.25 0.63 13.40 6.60 
Canada 285 812 10.80 14.43 27.15 0.92 1.00 13.40 2.05 
Chile 32 117 13.11 10.26 60.49 0.58 0.70 11.19 4.46 
Denmark 101 445 11.58 10.89 32.94 0.58 1.00 11.91 2.10 
Finland 89 374 12.91 19.76 33.74 0.50 1.00 11.66 1.18 
France 426 2,171 10.95 13.93 50.95 0.75 0.90 14.03 1.69 
Germany 294 1,273 10.74 10.81 48.74 0.42 0.92 14.40 1.94 
Greece 49 90 12.06 16.29 52.83 0.33 0.62 11.78 3.71 
Hong Kong 239 802 13.76 10.58 54.42 0.92 0.82 11.99 3.06 
India 97 252 12.77 27.73 51.38 0.92 0.42 13.11 4.66 
Indonesia 77 211 16.02 5.42 63.40 0.50 0.40 12.04 8.49 
Ireland 45 213 12.56 19.78 25.43 0.67 0.78 11.39 3.22 
Israel 14 30 10.82 22.61 47.57 0.67 0.48 11.72 2.11 
Italy 153 500 10.98 13.39 45.36 0.67 0.83 13.88 2.74 
Japan 993 3,665 8.16 13.29 40.13 0.75 0.90 15.35 -0.18 
Korea (South) 179 452 14.59 17.00 32.21 0.75 0.53 13.12 3.52 
Malaysia 265 1,112 10.71 3.84 50.20 0.92 0.68 11.33 2.66 
The Netherlands 175 937 12.83 11.89 40.72 0.50 1.00 12.75 2.31 
New Zealand 73 317 11.35 10.95 53.98 0.67 1.00 10.80 1.93 
Norway 102 384 12.92 14.18 39.46 0.58 1.00 11.96 2.04 
Philippines 34 112 12.65 18.92 72.22 0.83 0.27 11.27 5.43 
Portugal 45 132 11.54 7.53 50.49 0.42 0.87 11.57 2.98 
Singapore 192 766 11.05 7.44 53.30 1.00 0.86 11.26 1.24 
South Africa 184 775 16.07 14.03 50.34 0.83 0.44 11.78 6.16 
Spain 117 591 11.23 20.00 43.66 0.50 0.78 13.19 3.39 
Sweden 171 696 11.93 16.39 34.36 0.58 1.00 12.35 1.20 
Switzerland 144 771 11.38 15.34 39.26 0.67 1.00 12.40 0.91 
Taiwan 136 255 12.06 9.83 26.12 0.75 0.85 13.12 1.25 
Thailand 109 292 14.81 15.06 51.79 0.92 0.62 11.80 2.50 
United Kingdom 1,051 4,819 11.33 9.31 19.45 0.83 0.86 14.11 2.74 
United States 4,415 24,631 10.61 15.02 20.48 1.00 1.00 15.98 2.65 
Total (Mean) 10,827 50,201 10.95 13.66 29.90 0.86 0.93 14.64 2.40 
(Continued) 
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Table 1.  Continued 
Notes: The sample comprises 50,201 firm-year observations from 35 countries between 1990 and 2004 with sufficient financial data from Worldscope, analyst 
forecast data from I/B/E/S, and stock price data from Datastream to compute the dependent and independent variables in our analyses. The sample excludes 
countries with less than ten individual firm observations or with inflation rates above 25%, and firms with market value below 5 US$ million. The table reports 
the number of unique firms, the number of firm-year observations, and the means of the primary test variables and control variables by country. The implied 
cost of capital is the average cost of capital estimate implied by the mean I/B/E/S analyst consensus forecasts and stock prices using the Claus and Thomas 
(2001) model, the Gebhardt et. al. (2001) model, the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model, and the Easton (2004) model. See Hail and Leuz (2006) for 
details on the estimation procedure. Realized returns are buy-and-hold returns computed over one year, using price information adjusted for dividends and 
stock splits, and translated into US$. We measure implied costs of capital and realized returns as of month +10 after the fiscal-year end, and truncate both 
variables at the first and 99th percentile. Inside ownership equals the number of closely held shares by corporate insiders (field 05475) divided by the number of 
common shares outstanding (field 05301) as defined in Worldscope. We measure the level of disclosure regulation by the index of disclosure requirements in 
securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006). Legal quality represents the general quality of the legal environment and is measured as the rule of law index 
(divided by 10) from La Porta et al. (1997). GDP is countries’ annual gross domestic product (in constant US$ billion) as reported by the World Bank. We 
transform GDP using the natural log. Inflation is the yearly median of country-specific, one-year-ahead realized monthly percentage changes in local consumer 
price indices as reported in Datastream. 
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Table 2.  Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables 
Variables (N = 50,201) Mean Std. dev. P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
Test variables (%):        
Implied cost of capital 10.95 3.56 5.19 8.54 10.30 12.65 22.81 
Realized returns 13.66 43.56 -70.83 -13.01 9.50 33.87 163.69 
Inside ownership 29.90 23.75 0.03 9.59 25.84 47.85 87.14 
Control variables:      
Inflation 2.398 1.531 -0.885 1.546 2.436 3.029 8.734 
Market value (US$ million) 3,230.4 12,542.1 25.2 212.1 605.2 1,987.6 46,436.1 
Book-to-market 0.586 0.401 0.074 0.318 0.499 0.740 2.043 
Earnings variability 0.033 0.051 0.001 0.009 0.018 0.036 0.268 
Forecast bias 0.006 0.033 -0.048 -0.003 0.000 0.006 0.155 
Multiple shares 0.127 0.333      
Payout ratio 0.354 0.382 0.000 0.000 0.287 0.500 1.786 
Analyst following 9.7 7.8 1 4 7 14 34 
 
Notes: The sample comprises 50,201 firm-year observations from 35 countries between 1990 and 2004 with financial data from Worldscope, analyst forecast 
data from I/B/E/S, and stock price data from Datastream. We report descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the analyses. We 
use the following primary test variables: (1) the implied costs of capital are the means of four estimates for the implied cost of equity capital (Hail and Leuz, 
2006). (2) Realized returns are yearly buy-and-hold returns. (3) Inside ownership equals the number of closely held shares by corporate insiders (field 05475) 
divided by the number of common shares outstanding (field 05301) as defined in Worldscope. The independent variables are: inflation is the yearly median of 
country-specific, one-year-ahead realized monthly percentage changes in local consumer price indices as reported in Datastream. Market value is stock price 
times the number of shares outstanding (in US$ million). Book-to-market is the ratio of the accounting book value to the market value of equity. We measure 
earnings variability as a firm’s standard deviation of annual earnings per share over the last five years scaled by total assets per share. Forecast bias is the one-
year-ahead I/B/E/S analyst forecast error (mean forecast minus actual) scaled by forecast-period stock price. Multiple shares indicates which firms have more 
than one type of common shares or ordinary shares as defined in Worldscope (field 11501). This variable is only available for the most recent fiscal year and 
therefore time-invariant. We measure the payout ratio as dividends per share divided by earnings per share. Analyst following is the number of analysts issuing 
one-year-ahead earnings forecasts in I/B/E/S. Accounting data and market values are measured as of the fiscal-year end, implied costs of capital, realized 
returns, forecast bias, and analyst following as of month +10 after the fiscal-year end. In the analyses that follow, we apply a logit transformation to the 
percentage of inside ownership, i.e., ln(x/(1 – x)) where x is the raw value, and use the natural log of the raw variables where indicated. Except for variables 
with natural lower or upper bounds, we truncate all variables at the first and 99th percentile. 
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Table 3.  Implied cost of capital as dependent variable 
Panel A: Regression analysis of implied cost of capital on disclosure regulation and inside ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
OLS 
(Firm-year  
model, reduced) 
OLS 
(Firm-year  
model, reduced) 
OLS 
(Firm-year  
model, full) 
2SLS  
(Base ownership  
model) 
2SLS  
(IPO ownership  
model) 
OLS 
(Country-year  
model) 
Test variables:       
   Disclosure regulation -1.127* -1.337** -1.130 -1.790* -1.602* -2.129** 
 (-1.76) (-2.06) (-1.66) (-1.84) (-1.95) (-2.62) 
   Inside ownership  -0.085** -0.091** -0.347* -0.204* -0.322 
  (-2.53) (-2.40) (-1.84) (-1.76) (-1.49) 
Control variables:       
   Legal quality -2.192 -2.455* -2.549* -3.419** -2.940* -2.131 
 (-1.50) (-1.78) (-1.89) (-2.23) (-1.96) (-1.43) 
   Inflation 0.550*** 0.537*** 0.528*** 0.484*** 0.548*** 0.332*** 
 (3.41) (3.50) (3.74) (3.33) (3.80) (3.64) 
   Log(market value) -0.526*** -0.563*** -0.591*** -0.688*** -0.578*** -0.481 
 (-5.72) (-5.68) (-4.24) (-5.80) (-4.73) (-1.37) 
   Book-to-market 1.914*** 1.888*** 1.871*** 1.801*** 1.954*** 2.674*** 
 (6.56) (6.48) (6.35) (7.18) (6.86) (3.29) 
   Earnings variability 5.309*** 5.194*** 5.213*** 4.774*** 4.938*** 74.127*** 
 (8.08) (8.02) (8.59) (5.27) (6.33) (4.14) 
   Forecast bias 20.928*** 20.968*** 21.005*** 21.116*** 20.657*** 69.942*** 
 (9.59) (9.66) (9.72) (9.64) (8.70) (5.05) 
   Multiple shares   0.383 0.535* 0.398 0.856 
   (1.12) (1.97) (1.40) (1.21) 
   Payout ratio   0.036 -0.135 0.012 1.101 
   (0.36) (-0.81) (0.11) (0.92) 
   Log(analyst following)   0.059 0.014 0.019 -0.448 
   (0.36) (0.07) (0.12) (-1.11) 
Fixed effects:       
   Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R2 31.93% 32.12% 32.24% 30.58% 31.96% 63.57% 
N 50,201 50,201 50,201 50,201 39,374 382 
(Continued) 
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Table 3.  Continued 
Panel B: Path analysis of the effect of disclosure regulation on implied cost of capital via inside ownership 
 (1)  
OLS 
(Firm-year model, full) 
(2)  
2SLS 
(Base ownership model) 
 (3)  
OLS 
(Country-year model) 
Variables Std. coefficients Percent Std. coefficients Percent  Std. coefficients Percent 
Direct effect:        
   (i) Disclosure regulation -0.056 127% -0.088* 176%  -0.172** 110% 
 (-1.66)  (-1.84)   (-2.62)  
        
Indirect effect:        
   (ii) Disclosure regulation -0.217**  -0.186***   -0.155*  
 (-2.44)  (-3.04)   (-1.71)  
   (iii) Inside ownership -0.053**  -0.203*   -0.098  
 (-2.40)  (-1.84)   (-1.49)  
   (iv) Total indirect [(ii)*(iii)] 0.012 -27% 0.038 -76%  0.015 -10% 
        
Total effect [(i) + (iv)] -0.044 100% -0.050 100%  -0.157 100% 
N 50,201  50,201   382  
 
Notes: The sample comprises up to 50,201 firm-year observations from 35 countries between 1990 and 2004 (see Table 1). Panel A reports results from 
various OLS regression specifications of the cost-of-capital model using the implied cost of capital as the dependent variable. Models 1 through 5 are based on 
firm-year observations. In Model 4, we use the ownership model as described in the Appendix in the first stage of a two-stage-least-squares estimation (2SLS) 
and report the second stage results. Model 5 also reflects 2SLS estimation, but we use the initial public offering (IPO) model of ownership in the first stage 
(see the Appendix). In Model 6, we aggregate the firm-year observations into 382 country-year observations by computing medians. For binary indicator 
variables we compute the country-year means instead. We require at least 10 firm-year observations for a given country and year to be included. Panel B 
reports the direct and indirect effects of disclosure regulation on the implied cost of capital via inside ownership using path analysis and the structural model 
described in Exhibit 1. The three specifications correspond to Models 3, 4, and 6 in Panel A, respectively. The direct effect is the standardized coefficient 
estimate on disclosure regulation from the cost-of-capital model. The indirect effect equals the standardized coefficient estimate on disclosure regulation from 
the ownership model (see the Appendix) multiplied by the standardized coefficient estimate on inside ownership from the cost-of-capital model. The total 
effect of disclosure regulation is the sum of the direct and indirect effects. For a description of the dependent and control variables see Table 2. We use the 
natural log of the raw values where indicated. We include an intercept, one-digit SIC industry, and year fixed effects in the regressions, but do not report the 
coefficients. The table reports coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by country. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 4.  Realized returns as dependent variable 
Panel A: Regression analysis of realized returns on disclosure regulation and inside ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
OLS 
(Firm-year  
model, reduced) 
OLS 
(Firm-year  
model, reduced) 
OLS 
(Firm-year  
model, full) 
2SLS  
(Base ownership  
model) 
2SLS  
(IPO ownership  
model) 
OLS 
(Country-year  
model) 
Test variables:       
   Disclosure regulation 2.673 2.470 1.659 -16.287** -16.866*** -7.231 
 (0.92) (0.77) (0.54) (-2.65) (-2.94) (-1.56) 
   Inside ownership  -0.074 -0.125 -6.328*** -5.262*** -2.857 
  (-0.34) (-0.55) (-3.36) (-3.43) (-1.56) 
Control variables:       
   Legal quality 10.682* 10.508* 10.043 -5.948 -7.657 1.826 
 (1.76) (1.73) (1.67) (-0.58) (-0.75) (0.23) 
   Log(market value) -0.504*** -0.536*** -0.480* -2.666*** -2.189*** -1.673 
 (-5.15) (-3.52) (-1.84) (-5.40) (-4.86) (-1.15) 
   Book-to-market 6.580*** 6.565*** 6.713*** 5.724*** 6.061*** 15.032** 
 (7.68) (7.79) (7.81) (4.59) (4.88) (2.62) 
   Multiple shares   0.226 3.613** 2.758*** -1.586 
   (0.20) (2.49) (2.91) (-0.44) 
   Payout ratio   -1.809*** -5.724*** -6.137*** 0.111 
   (-4.95) (-4.63) (-8.25) (0.02) 
   Log(analyst following)   -0.097 -1.314 -1.551 2.656 
   (-0.16) (-0.83) (-1.13) (1.32) 
Fixed effects:       
   Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R2 6.29% 6.29% 6.31% 4.56% 1.37% 48.07% 
N 50,201 50,201 50,201 50,201 39,374 382 
(Continued) 
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Table 4.  Continued 
Panel B: Path analysis of the effect of disclosure regulation on realized returns via inside ownership 
 (1)  
OLS 
(Firm-year model, full) 
(2)  
2SLS 
(Base ownership model) 
 (3)  
OLS 
(Country-year model) 
Variables Std. coefficients Percent Std. coefficients Percent  Std. coefficients Percent 
Direct effect:        
   (i) Disclosure regulation 0.007 88% -0.066** 6,600%  -0.059 131% 
 (0.54)  (-2.65)   (-1.56)  
        
Indirect effect:        
   (ii) Disclosure regulation -0.217**  -0.214**   -0.155*  
 (-2.44)  (-2.43)   (-1.71)  
   (iii) Inside ownership -0.006  -0.302***   -0.088  
 (-0.55)  (-3.36)   (-1.56)  
   (iv) Total indirect [(ii)*(iii)] 0.001 12% 0.065 -6,500%  0.014 -31% 
        
Total effect [(i) + (iv)] 0.008 100% -0.001 100%  -0.045 100% 
N 50,201  50,201   382  
 
Notes: The sample comprises up to 50,201 firm-year observations from 35 countries between 1990 and 2004 (see Table 1). Panel A reports results from 
various OLS regression specifications of the cost-of-capital model using realized returns as the dependent variable. Models 1 through 5 are based on firm-year 
observations. In Model 4, we use the ownership model as described in the Appendix in the first stage of a two-stage-least-squares estimation (2SLS) and report 
the second stage results. Model 5 also reflects 2SLS estimation, but we use the initial public offering (IPO) model of ownership in the first stage (see the 
Appendix). In Model 6, we aggregate the firm-year observations into 382 country-year observations by computing medians. For binary indicator variables we 
compute the country-year means instead. We require at least 10 firm-year observations for a given country and year to be included. Panel B reports the direct 
and indirect effects of disclosure regulation on realized returns via inside ownership using path analysis and the structural model described in Exhibit 1. The 
three specifications correspond to Models 3, 4, and 6 in Panel A, respectively. The direct effect is the standardized coefficient estimate on disclosure regulation 
from the cost-of-capital model. The indirect effect equals the standardized coefficient estimate on disclosure regulation from the ownership model (see the 
Appendix) multiplied by the standardized coefficient estimate on inside ownership from the cost-of-capital model. The total effect of disclosure regulation is 
the sum of the direct and indirect effects. For a description of the dependent and control variables see Table 2. We use the natural log of the raw values where 
indicated. We include an intercept, one-digit SIC industry, and year fixed effects in the regressions, but do not report the coefficients. The table reports 
coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by country. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 5.  Analysis of inside ownership, disclosure regulation, and systematic cost of capital 
Panel A: Systematic realized returns based on Fama-French two-factor model and portfolio-sorts 
 Two-way sorting by  
disclosure regulation and 
predicted ownership 
 One-way sorting by  
predicted ownership  
within country 
Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Test variables:      
   Disclosure regulation -0.34*** -0.58***  -0.30* -0.31 
 (-4.44) (-3.61)  (-1.85) (-1.26) 
   Inside ownershipPred -0.06*** -0.12***  -0.05** -0.07 
 (-3.49) (-2.86)  (-2.06) (-0.95) 
Control variables:      
   Legal quality -0.78*** -0.90***  -0.45*** -0.46** 
 (-3.97) (-3.90)  (-3.07) (-2.30) 
   Multiple shares  -0.06   0.06 
  (-0.73)   (0.83) 
   Payout ratio  -0.16   -0.17 
  (-1.35)   (-0.91) 
   Log(analyst following)  -0.07   0.04 
  (-1.17)   (0.51) 
      
R2 28.1% 31.5%  12.1% 14.0% 
N 84 84  169 169 
 
Panel B: Systematic implied cost of capital based on Fama-French two-factor model and portfolio-sorts 
 Two-way sorting by  
disclosure regulation and 
predicted ownership 
 One-way sorting by  
predicted ownership  
within country 
Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Test variables:      
   Disclosure regulation -0.24*** -0.38***  -0.22** -0.26* 
 (-7.25) (-5.75)  (-2.20) (-1.98) 
   Inside ownershipPred -0.04*** -0.08***  -0.03** -0.06* 
 (-4.55) (-4.92)  (-2.48) (-1.76) 
Control variables:      
   Legal quality -0.27*** -0.73***  -0.23*** -0.23 
 (-3.25) (-5.94)  (-2.81) (-1.68) 
   Inflation  -0.04***   0.01 
  (-3.24)   (0.69) 
   Earnings variability  0.03   0.66 
  (0.04)   (0.92) 
   Forecast bias  -3.60**   0.09 
  (-2.42)   (0.06) 
   Multiple shares  0.10**   0.07* 
  (2.51)   (1.96) 
   Payout ratio  -0.21***   -0.09 
  (-4.21)   (-1.05) 
   Log(analyst following)  -0.05*   0.01 
  (-1.97)   (0.16) 
      
R2 43.3% 58.4%  18.4% 25.4% 
N 84 84  169 169 
(Continued) 
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Table 5.  Continued 
Panel C: Path analysis of the effect of disclosure regulation on systematic cost of capital 
 (1) 
Two-way sorting by  
disclosure regulation and 
predicted ownership 
 (2) 
One-way sorting by  
predicted ownership  
within country 
Variables Std. coeff. Percent  Std. coeff. Percent 
Systematic realized returns as dependent variable     
Direct effect:      
   (i) Disclosure regulation -0.44*** 124%  -0.27* 123% 
 (-4.44)   (-1.85)  
      
Indirect effect:      
   (ii) Disclosure regulation -0.22**   -0.22**  
 (-2.44)   (-2.44)  
   (iii) Inside ownership -0.39***   -0.23**  
 (-3.49)   (-2.06)  
   (iv) Total indirect [(ii)*(iii)] 0.086 -24%  0.051 -23% 
      
Total effect [(i) + (iv)] -0.354 100%  -0.219 100% 
      
Systematic implied cost of capital as dependent variable    
Direct effect:      
   (i) Disclosure regulation -0.63*** 119%  -0.43** 119% 
 (-7.25)   (-2.20)  
      
Indirect effect:      
   (ii) Disclosure regulation -0.22**   -0.22**  
 (-2.44)   (-2.44)  
   (iii) Inside ownership -0.45***   -0.31**  
 (-4.55)   (-2.48)  
   (iv) Total indirect [(ii)*(iii)] 0.099 -19%  0.068 -19% 
      
Total effect [(i) + (iv)] -0.531 100%  -0.362 100% 
(Continued) 
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Table 5.  Continued 
Notes: The base sample comprises 50,201 firm-year observations from 35 countries between 1990 and 2004 (see 
Table 1). The table reports results from regression analyses of the systematic component of cost of capital on inside 
ownership, disclosure regulation and additional control variables. In Panel A (for realized returns) and Panel B (for 
implied costs of capital), we sort firms into portfolios using two approaches. For the two-way sorting, we start with 
forming 84 portfolios by intersecting ten ranks of disclosure regulation with ten ranks of predicted inside ownership 
based on Model 1 in the Appendix. For the one-way sorting, we form 169 portfolios by ranking all firm-year 
observations in a given country into five groups based on predicted inside ownership. We then match twelve months 
of stock returns to each firm-year starting in October of each year t+1.We require a minimum of 60 monthly return 
observations per portfolio. For each portfolio we then estimate the following time-series regression: (RP,t – RF,t) = ap 
+ b1,p (RM,t – RF,t) + b2,p HMLt + !p,t, where RP is the equal-weighted buy-and-hold return of the portfolio, RF is the 
return on a one-month U.S. Treasury bill, RM is a value-weighted return on a world market index from Datastream, 
and HML is the Fama and French (1998) value-weighted global book-to-market factor. Next, for realized returns, 
we calculate the systematic risk of the portfolio by multiplying the fitted coefficients with the average values of (RM 
– RF) and HML over the estimation period. For the implied costs of capital, we calculate the systematic risk by 
multiplying the same fitted coefficients with the value-weighted average implied cost of capital for our sample (as a 
proxy for the market risk factor), and with the difference in value-weighted average implied costs of capital between 
the sample firms in the three highest and the three lowest book-to-market deciles (as a proxy for the book-to-market 
factor). In Panel C, we report the direct and indirect effects of disclosure regulation on systematic cost of capital via 
inside ownership using path analysis and the structural model described in Exhibit 1. The direct effect is the 
standardized coefficient estimate on disclosure regulation from the Fama-French two-factor model with portfolio 
sorts from Panels A and B (Models 1 and 3). The indirect effect equals the standardized coefficient estimate on 
disclosure regulation from the ownership model in the firm-year analysis (Appendix, Model 1) multiplied by the 
standardized coefficient estimate on inside ownership from the Fama-French two-factor model with portfolio sorts. 
The total effect of disclosure regulation is the sum of the direct and indirect effects. We report (standardized) OLS 
coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by country. 
Panel C reports only the primary variables of interest, but the full set of controls and fixed-effects is included in the 
regressions. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table A1.  Descriptive statistics for ownership model 
Variables (N = 50,201) Mean Std. dev. P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
Test variables (%):        
Inside ownership 29.90 23.75 0.03 9.59 25.84 47.85 87.14 
Control variables:       
Sales (US$ million) 2,560.6 11,843.4 1.4 156.9 493.3 1,706.6 32,164.3 
Sales/PPE 8.147 14.280 0.171 2.076 4.194 7.977 78.741 
R&D/sales 0.018 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.208 
R&D indicator 0.653 0.476      
Return variability 0.098 0.041 0.039 0.068 0.090 0.121 0.218 
Multiple shares 0.127 0.333      
Payout ratio 0.354 0.382 0.000 0.000 0.287 0.500 1.786 
Analyst following 9.7 7.8 1 4 7 14 34 
GDP (US$ billion) 4,977.8 3,999.2 56.5 639.1 4,885.1 8,647.6 10,623.9 
 
Notes: The sample comprises 50,201 firm-year observations from 35 countries between 1990 and 2004 with financial data from Worldscope, analyst forecast 
data from I/B/E/S, and stock price data from Datastream. We report descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the analyses. The 
dependent variable, inside ownership, equals the number of closely held shares by corporate insiders (field 05475) divided by the number of common shares 
outstanding (field 05301) as defined in Worldscope. The independent variables are: sales equal gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns 
and allowances in US$ million. Sales/PPE is sales divided by gross property, plant and equipment. R&D/sales is the ratio of research and development 
expense divided by sales. If research and development expense is missing, we set the R&D indicator variable equal to one. Return variability is the annual 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns. Multiple shares indicates which firms have more than one type of common shares or ordinary shares as defined in 
Worldscope (field 11501). This variable is only available for the most recent fiscal year and therefore time-invariant. We measure the payout ratio as dividends 
per share divided by earnings per share. Analyst following is the number of analysts issuing one-year-ahead earnings forecasts in I/B/E/S. GDP is countries’ 
annual gross domestic product (in constant US$ billion) as reported by the World Bank. Accounting data are measured as of the fiscal-year end, return 
variability and analyst following as of month +10 after the fiscal-year end. Except for variables with natural lower or upper bounds, we truncate all variables at 
the first and 99th percentile. 
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Table A2.  Determinants of inside ownership 
Variables 
(1)  
(Base ownership  
model) 
(2)  
(IPO ownership  
model) 
(3)  
(Country-year  
model) 
Test variables:    
   Disclosure regulation -2.574** -2.819** -0.585* 
 (-2.44) (-2.66) (-1.71) 
Control variables:    
   Log(sales) 0.725*** 0.708*** 0.459 
 (4.36) (3.62) (1.56) 
   Log(sales)2 -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.022 
 (-4.54) (-3.60) (-1.57) 
   Sales/PPE 0.003 0.005* 0.017 
 (0.98) (2.02) (0.40) 
   R&D/sales -2.944*** -2.141*** 7.066 
 (-5.91) (-2.82) (0.84) 
   R&D indicator 0.339** 0.487*** 1.375*** 
 (2.44) (2.76) (3.67) 
   Return variability 4.589*** 4.044** -3.901 
 (3.04) (2.35) (-1.30) 
   Multiple shares 0.437 0.459* -0.152 
 (1.60) (1.75) (-0.66) 
   Payout ratio -0.517*** -0.533*** 0.220 
 (-4.59) (-4.48) (0.55) 
   Log(analyst following) -0.340** -0.429*** 0.432*** 
 (-2.53) (-2.82) (3.00) 
   Log(GDP) -0.085 -0.085 -0.131* 
 (-0.71) (-0.67) (-1.80) 
   Legal quality -1.924** -2.425** -1.986*** 
 (-2.11) (-2.36) (-5.22) 
Fixed effects:    
   Industry Yes Yes Yes 
   Year Yes Yes Yes 
    
R2 27.36% 27.30% 60.15% 
N 50,201 39,374 382 
 
Notes: The sample comprises up to 50,201 firm-year observations from 35 countries between 1990 and 2004 (see 
Table 1). The table reports various specifications of the ownership model. Models 1 and 2 are based on firm-year 
observations. In Model 2, in the spirit of an initial public offering (IPO) model, we set the independent variables 
equal to the earliest realization per firm over the sample period, and delete the corresponding first firm-year 
observation from the analysis. In Model 3, we aggregate the firm-year observations into 382 country-year 
observations by computing medians. For binary indicator variables (e.g., multiple shares) we compute the country-
year means. We require at least 10 firm-year observations for a given country and year to be included in the country-
year analysis. We use inside ownership, i.e., the number of closely held shares by corporate insiders divided by the 
number of common shares outstanding, as the dependent variable. We apply the following logit transformation to 
the percentage of inside ownership: ln(x/(1 – x)), where x is the raw value. We measure the level of disclosure 
regulation by the index of disclosure requirements in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006). Legal quality 
represents the general quality of the legal environment and is measured as the rule of law index from La Porta et al. 
(1997). For a description of the remaining control variables see Table A1. We use the natural log of the raw values 
and square the variables where indicated. We include an intercept, one-digit SIC industry, and year fixed effects in 
the regressions, but do not report the coefficients. We report OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-
statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by country. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
